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I. INTRODUCTION 
Can one speak coherently of Bonaventure's philosophy? Or is such an idea 
nothing more than a modern hermeneutical fancy? The arguments against 
the view that Bonaventure has a philosophy are of diverse origin. Certain 
influential students of medieval intellectual history have advanced the fol- 
lowing argument: it is improper, a kind of basic category error, to speak of 
philosophy as an autonomous discipline practiced within medieval faculties 
of theology. This historiographical tendency derives from certain nine- 
teenth-century continental ideas about enlightenment, progress, and secu- 
larization. As the French Revolution is viewed as the birth of modernity, so, 
on this view, the Condemnations of 1277 beget philosophy as an "autono- 
mous" discipline within the Middle Ages. "Autonomous" in this context 
means little more than "independent from theology." In the writings of the 
Arts-masters at the University of Paris, so the argument goes, one can find 
enlightenment before the Age of Enlightenment, a renascence before the 
Renaissance, and a humanism before Humanism.' 
If we are to pose hermeneutical questions of the sort on which this 
historiographical hypothesis turns, we ought perhaps begin by asking the 
following general question: what is philosophy in the Middle Ages? Or, put 
more concretely: what remains of medieval philosophy, if we include in our 
account of the discipline of philosophy the notion that what the theologi do 
Earlier versions of this article were presented as lectures at Boston College, Yale 
University, St. Bonaventure University, and at the University of Notre Dame. I would 
like to thank the participants of these sessions for their comments. 
1. See, for example, Kurt Flasch, Aujklarung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 
1277 (Mainz, 1989); Luca Bianchi, I1 Vascouo e i Filosoj. La condannaparigina dell277 
e l'evoluzione dell' Aristotelismo scolastico (Bergamo, 1990); Alain de Libera, Penser au 
Moyen Age (Paris, 1991). The basic study concerning the condemnations is still 
Roland Hissette, Enqite sur les 21 9 articles condamnis a Paris le 7 Mars 1277, Philosophas 
Midihaux 22 (Paris, 1977); see also the critical remarks of R. Hissette, "Note sur la 
reaction anti-rationaliste' d'Etienne Tempier," Revue philosophique de Louvain 88 
(1990): 395-403. 
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is by definition not philosophical?2 To be sure, Bonaventure, like Albert the
Great, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, and John Duns Scotus, was a
member of a faculty of theology. He and his colleagues understood them-
selves as "theologi"
In addition to the sources discussed above, Dante Aligheri's works offer
another nearly contemporary source for understanding how these medieval
thinkers conceived of themselves and their works. In the fourth sphere of
Paradiso, the sphere of the sun, Dante introduces Thomas Aquinas and
Bonaventure accompanied by a number of their contemporaries and
predecessors—figures, for the most part, with reputations as philosophers
as well as theologians. Bonaventure's companions include Hugh of St.
Victor, Peter Comestor, and Peter of Spain, the prophet Nathan and John
Chrysostom, Anselm of Canterbury and Donatus, Rhabanus Maurus and
Joachim of Fiore.3 There seems here to be no sense of a distinction between
"authentic" philosophers and "mere" theologians. While, in all likelihood,
Dante was personally acquainted with the University of Paris at the begin-
ning of the fourteenth century, his Paradise appears to assume nothing like
the rigid distinction between philosophers and theologians presupposed by
intellectual historians like De Libera, Imbach, and Flasch.
If one re-reads medieval intellectual history on the assumption that to
practice philosophy is something like "to exercise pure human reason," one
is left with the difficult conclusion that these thinkers did not practice phi-
losophy. Etienne Gilson—he was also a distinguished Dante scholar—must
be turning over in his grave. It was his life's work to discourage precisely this
sort of anachronistic use of modern notions of philosophy as a litmus test for
the intellectual seriousness of medieval thinkers. Gilson sought, that is to say,
to understand the medievalwaγ of thinking, to describe its proper "spirit." It is
interesting to note that the two figures he chose to represent the peculiarly
medieval study of philosophy were Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure.
Shortly after writing his seminal work on the importance of medieval thought
in Descartes's philosophy, his Index scolastico-cartesien, Gilson began research
on these two medieval philosophers. Though interrupted in his efforts by the
First World War, he went on to produce three clearly related works: Saint
Thomas d'Aquin, Le Thomisme, a n d La philosophie de saint BonaventureP
To come immediately to the point, I might invoke Gilson's conclusion to
this last work—a vital and unsurpassed study of Bonaventure's mind—and
2. See Jan A. Aertsen, "Gibt es eine mittelalterliche Philosophic?" in Philosophie
und geistiges Erbe des Mittelalters, ed. A. Speer (Kόln: 1994), 13-30; see also Philosophis-
chesjahrbuch 102 (1995): 161-76.
3. Dante Aligned, La Commedia divina, Paradiso XII, 133-41.
4. See Etienne Gilson, L'espήt de la philosophie medievale, Etudes de philosophie
medievaleSS, 2d ed., (Paris: J. Vrin, 1944).
5. Gilson's Index scolastico-cartesien and his thesis La liberte chez Descartes et la
theologie were published in 1913. The first editions of the books on Aquinas and
Bonaventure were published between 1919 and 1925. See Laurence K. Shook,
Etienne Gilson, The Etienne Gilson Series 6, (Toronto: 1984) esp. chaps. 4 and 7.
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neatly resolve our initial question and conclude this article. In that conclu-
sion, Gilson characterizes Bonaventure's philosophy as perhaps the greatest
synthesis of Christian thought ever realized, and the most peculiarly medieval
one. From a "rationalistic" perspective, however, Bonaventure's philosophy
would not appear to be "philosophical" at all, since, as Gilson points out, the
Franciscan refuses to accept the Aristotelian Organon as the sole criterion of
truth in respect of philosophical questions.6 For Gilson, this refusal consti-
tutes the decisive element differentiating Bonaventure's thought from those
of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. It also explains why Bonaventure
participates in the great intellectual debates of his time in a manner very
different from the two great Dominicans.
One scholar give an authoritative reply to Gilson's attempt to portray
Bonaventure's thought as "Franciscan wisdom" and "the metaphysics of
Christian mysticism."7 In his influential history of thirteenth-century phi-
losophy, Fernand van Steenberghen emphasizes the institutional locus of
Bonaventure's writings—they are the products of a professor at a university.
Although van Steenberghen means to foreground Bonaventure's involve-
ment in the intellectual debates of the thirteenth century, he has a very
qualified view of the domain of Bonaventure's philosophy, indeed one that
seems overly-restricted and weak. He sees Bonaventure's approach to phi-
losophy as eclectic at its roots; Bonaventure's real contributions, van Steen-
berghen claims, are theological in nature.8
I could go on reporting the colorful history of approaches to the
thought of Bonaventure. To do so would not be without interest, because
the history of speculation about Bonaventure parallels certain trends within
the received understanding of medieval philosophy in general. The fact
that Bonaventure's thought counts among the most neglected subjects in
the current study of medieval philosophy is not as appreciated as it should
be. Apart from a flurry of interest in 1974—the heady 700th anniversary of
the deaths of both Bonaventure and Aquinas—what study there has been
of Bonaventure has been of his role within the Franciscan spiritual tradition
and in the history of the mendicant movement. I am sorry to say that, in my
opinion, the topos of the "Franciscan vocation" of Bonaventure all too often
stands in the place of serious and precise historical research. We know very
little, for example, about the sources and traditions influencing Bonaven-
ture around 1235, when he began his academic career as a student in Paris
6. Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure (Paris: 1924), pp. 387, 396.
Gilson had first approached the topic as a private research project during his stay
in Lille in 1913. As L. K. Shook (Etienne Gilson, pp. 126-29) points out in his
biography, Gilson's presentation of Bonaventure as an anti-thomist Christian phi-
losopher gave rise to great controversies among both Catholic and non-Catholic
university philosophers.
7. See in particular the section of Gilson's introductory chapter titled "Le
probleme bonaventurien," pp. 59-75.
8. Fernand van Steenberghen, La theologίe au XIIIe siecle; 2nd. ed. (Paris:
1991), chap. V.
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(the year, you will note, before Philip the Chancellor died). It is clear, to go
further, that Bonaventure heard the lectures of Alexander of Hales, yet no
study exists of the relationship between Alexander and Bonaventure.
Allow me to add here a few remarks about the Quaracchi-edition. The
work of the Leonine editors of Thomas Aquinas has clearly become an
engine driving an increasingly deep and more sophisticated historical and
systematic understanding of Thomas's thought. Ironically, the much more
timely completion of the "critical" edition of Bonaventure's opera omnia,
completed by the eminent Collegio di S. Bonaventura in Quaracchi, has
had an unfortunate side-effect.9 One can find no reference to the fruits of
the great international edition-projects of recent years—the Aήstoteles lat-
inus, Avicenna latinus, Averrois opera, not to mention the works of his near
contemporaries Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, and successors Giles
of Rome, Henry of Gent, and John Duns Scotus—in the Quaracchi texts.
The historical basis for any study of Bonaventure's relationship to the
debates of his day is thus from the outset tightly circumscribed.
I will conclude these rather extensive but, I trust, not uninformative
introductory remarks by highlighting three areas that I see as important for
future research on Bonaventure:
1. As a body of texts, I consider the academic writings of Bonaventure
before his election as the seventh Minister General of the Franciscan
Order to be of singular importance for charting the currents at Paris
within the first half of the thirteenth century. They reflect the influ-
ence of the pivotal Parisian magistή of this period, like Philip the
Chancellor, Richard Rufus, and, above all, Alexander of Hales. Such
study, of course, would contribute significantly to a more philologically
and historically solid estimation of the young Bonaventure. Why not
make, for example, the works of Alexander of Hales, as reflected in his
most brilliant student, the starting point of generalizations about puta-
tively "Franciscan" positions on intellectual debates? This would cer-
tainly be preferable to some fuzzy inferences from a still fuzzier notion
of "Franciscan spirituality."
2. Very little is known about the influence of the school of St. Victor in the
thirteenth century. This neglect is noted with particular acuity by serious
students of Bonaventure because Bonaventure's works subsequent to
his election as Minister General manifest the lively influence of Vic-
torine thought in Paris. Those who know something about the enduring
institutional vitality of the school of St. Victor will not be surprised by this
observation. Bonaventure seems to see the Victorine monastic model as
9. Wolfgang Kluxen, "Die geschichtliche Erforschung der mittelalterlichen
Philosophic und die Neuscholastik," in Chήstliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des
19. und 2O.Jahrhunderts, ed. E. Coreth, W. M. Neidl, G. Pfligersdorfer (Kόln: 1988),
pp. 362-89, esp. 366 and 372-73; Mathias Kόck, "Quaracchi—Der franziskanische
Beitrag zur Erforschung des Mittelalters," in Chήstliche Philosophie, pp. 390-96.
BONAVENTURE AND THE QUESTION OF A MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 29
providing a means of reconciling tensions between the desires of the in-
tellect and the desires of the soul.10 Bonaventure's use of St. Victor af-
fords another, more serious means of speaking about the place of
Franciscan thought within the intellectual debates of the period.
3. I mention lastly the power struggles among intellectuals in the last
third of the thirteenth century, which lead, first, to the condemnations
issued on 10 December 1270. By that time, Bonaventure, along with
Thomas Aquinas, had long been engaged in the Parisian debates. As is
well known, two of Bonaventure's last great collations, On the Ten
Commendments and On the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spiήt, constitute a
prelude to the Condemnations of 1270, while the Collations on the
Sixdays offer a postlude.11 They provide insight, at a very high level,
into what was really at stake. Now, Ruedi Imbach likes to style Bonaven-
ture a kind of "ideological trailblazer" for the later, more extensive
Condemnations of 1277. My answer to this kind of a historiographical
"Molotov cocktail" is clear and distinct: Imbach's argument that
Bonaventure's "reductio ad unum" is the blueprint for Tempier's "reduc-
tio ad papam" is without any historical or textual warrant.12
A historical perspective such as the one I am outlining shows how
Bonaventure's oeuvrefits within, and reflects the principle intellectual devel-
opments of, the thirteenth century. But what, you will ask, is Bonaventure's
own view? The question about Bonaventure's approach to philosophy com-
monly figures in the debates alluded to above as a kind of a touchstone. To
answer it is to take a position on a battlefield where the lines are already
tightly drawn. Let us raise the question anew: does Bonaventure have his own
unique approach to philosophy? In fact, does he have a philosophy at all?
II. TOTA NOSTRA METAPHYSICA
My answer to these questions begins with the first collation of the Hexae-
meron. The choice of this text may be surprising. In 1959, Joseph Ratzinger
10. Andreas Speer, "Von der Wissenschaft zur Weisheit. Philosophic im Uber-
gang bei Bonaventura," in (eds.), Weisheit und Wissenschaft, ed. T. Borsche and J.
Kreuzer (Mύnchen: 1995), pp. 115-127; Kent Emery, Jr., "Reading the World
Rightly and Squarely: Bonaventure's Doctrine of the Cardinal Virtues," Traditio 39
(1983): 183-218, esp. 214-18; Zachary Hayes, "Bonaventure. Mystery of the Triune
God" in The History of Franciscan Theology, ed. K. B. Osborne (St. Bonaventure:
1994), pp. 39-125; see further, intro. of Zachary Hayes, Saint Bonaventure's Disputed
Questions on the Mystery of the Tήnity (New York: 1979), pp. 13-29.
11. See van Steenberghen, La theologie au XIIIe siecle, pp. 427-29, 472-82.
12. Ruedi Imbach, Laien in der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Hinweise und Anregun-
gen zu einem vernachlάssigten Thema, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 14, (Amster-
dam: 1989), pp. 151-57.
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gave this text an interpretation that has stuck with it ever since: the Colla-
tiones in Hexaemeron are a kind of manifesto—the manifesto of anti-Aristo-
telian, anti-philosophical, anti-scholasticism.13 Now, Ratzinger's
interpretation reads like the reflex reaction of a certain kind of Catholi-
cism, and the mislabeling of this text may be the single greatest cause for
the overemphasis on Bonaventure's "anti-philosophism." This is a great
shame, for in no other work does he give such a systematic and concise
presentation of his general approach to philosophy, as one can see imme-
diately in the first Collatio.
Quoting Colossians 2:3, Bonaventure relates the seven-fold treasure
of our knowledge and wisdom to Christ. He is the central point in a
sevenfold sense: in terms of essence, nature, distance, doctrine, modera-
tion, justice, and concorde.14 In the very same context, Bonaventure ob-
serves that the first science—related to essence—from which all inquiry
must begin, is metaphysics. This is because metaphysics proceeds from the
consideration of the principles of created and particular substances to the
consideration of the universal and uncreated substance; that is, to that
Being (ad Mud esse) that has the character of a principle, a center, and a
goal (ratiopήncipii, medii etfinis).λb For this reason, metaphysics cannot be
understood as an investigation proceeding from the consideration of a
purely formal subject, like the "ens inquantum ens' (the being as such).
Rather, it follows the principle of causal exemplarity. From the very begin-
ning, that is, being must be understood in a twofold way. It is both "esse
ex se et secundum se et propter se" (being as subsistent, self-modeled, and
self-intended) as well as "esse ex alio et secundum aliud et propter aliud" (being
as contingent, modeled on another, and tending to another). It is the task
of metaphysics to explain the relationship between per se (subsistent) being
and contingent being.16 Consequently, the proper subject of metaphysics
13. Joseph Ratzinger, Die Geschichtsphilosophie des hi. Bonaventura (Mύnchen:
1959).
14. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,11, V 331a: "Propositum igitur nostrum est
ostendere, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei abscon-
diti, et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum. Est autem septiforme medium,
scilicet essentiae, naturae, distantiae, doctrinae, modestίae, iustitiae, concordiae.
Primum est de consideratione metaphysici, secundum physici, tertium mathe-
matici, quartum logici, quintum ethici, sextum politici seu iuristarum, septimum
theologi."
15. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,11, V 331b: "Metaphysicus autem, licet assurgat
ex consideratione principiorum substantiae creatae et particularis ad universalem
et increatam et ad illud esse, ut habet rationem principii, medii et finis."
16. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,12, V 33lab: "Primum ergo medium est essen-
tiae aeternali generatione primarium. Esse enim non est nisi dupliciter: vel esse,
quod est ex se et secundum se et propter se, vel esse, quod est ex alio et secundum
aliud et propter aliud. Necesse etiam est, ut esse, quod est ex se, sit secundum se et
propter se. Esse ex se est in ratione originantis; esse secundum se in ratione
exemplantis, et esse propter se in ratione finientis vel terminantis; id est in ratione
principii, medii et finis seu termini."
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is to think about being as the cause in an exemplary manner of all that
exists (esse in ratione omnia exemplantis). The metaphysician thus also con-
siders being as a productive principle (rationepήncipii omnia oήginantis) or
ultimate goal {ratione ultimi finis). This is the point of interaction shared
by the metaphysician, the physicist, and the moral philosopher.17 With the
phrase "Haec est tota nostra metaphysica' (that is our entire metaphysics),
Bonaventure introduces a neat list of topics delineating the proper field
of study of the ideal philosopher. The topics included in Bonaventure's
metaphysics are: "emanation" (emanatio), "exemplarity" (exemplaήtas), and
"consummation" (consummatio), by which he means being "as illuminated
by the spiritual radiation and reduced to the highest" (illuminaή per radios
spirituales et reduci ad summum).ι&
Bonaventure draws several consequences here, which I will summerize
in four points. Each is important for the accurate reconstruction of his
thought:
1. He claims that the existence of truth can never be denied because
without truth, nothing can be considered or understood ("nee aliquo
modo aliqua veήtas sciή potest nisi per Mam υeήtatem") .1 9
2. To "know something," in the strict sense of the term, is to understand
it with certainty. For Bonaventure, this means to understand it by
means of, or in relationship to, an immutable truth ("nihil sciatur nisi
per veritatem immutabilem") .20
3. The intelligibility of things corresponds to their ontological structure,
and vice-versa ("idem estpήncipium essendi et cognoscendi").21
4. The mind's first concept is the "esse divinum"; the divine being is an a
pήoή condition for the entire possibility of knowing ("esse enim divinum
primum est, quod venit in mente") ,22
17. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,13, V 331 b: "Metaphysicus enim assurgit ad illud
esse considerandum in ratione principii omnia originantis; et in hoc convenit cum
physico, qui origines rerum considerat. Assurgit etiam ad considerandum illud esse
in ratione ultimi finis; et in hoc convenit cum morali sive ethico, qui reducit omnia
ad unum summum bonum ut ad finem ultimum, considerando felicitatem sive
practicam sive speculativam. Sed ut considerat illud esse in ratione omnia exem-
plantis, cum nullo communicat et verus est metaphysicus."
18. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,17, V 332b: "Hoc est medium metaphysicum
reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysica: de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de
consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum. Et
sic eris verus metaphysicus."
For the genesis of Bonaventure's metaphysical thought, see my article
"Metaphysica reducens. Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft im Verstandnis Bonaven-
turas," Recherches de Theologie ancienne et medievale 57 (1990): 142-82.
19. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,13, V 331b.
20. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,13, V 331b.
21. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,13, V 331b.
22. Collationes in Hexaemeron 10,6, V 378a.
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We might call these basic teachings, to employ a formulation of Romano
Guarding the "system-constituting" elements of Bonaventure's thought
("systembildende Elemente') . 2 3 I will attempt to illustrate the role that they play
through an analysis of three central Bonaventurian hermeneutical terms:
certitudo, illuminatio, and reductio.
III. CERTITUDO
Bonaventure opens his disputed questions on the mystery of the Trinity, his
Quaestiones disputatae de mysteήo Tήnitatis, by pointing out what the condi-
tions are, in addition to the possession of divine grace, for the study of the
Trinity. The first two conditions are what Bonaventure calls the "foundation
of certain knowledge," and the "foundation of knowledge by faith."24 In
introducing these terms, Bonaventure raises questions about what these
foundations are, and how they can be examined. This discussion of the
conditions for the study of the Trinity is very typical of Bonaventure's
writing; the search for certitude is a Bonaventurian leitmotif. This also says
much about Bonaventure's habits as a thinker, and suggests an answer as to
his view of the status of philosophy.
The twofold distinction concerning the foundation of knowledge
evokes the distinction between philosophical knowledge dealing with a
knowledge of the truth that can be scrutinized as "certain knowing" (ut
scrutabilis notitia certa) and theological knowledge containing a knowledge
of truth that is worthy of belief by "pious knowing" {ut credibilis notitia pia) . 2 5
While it may seem strange to find arguments for the indispensable need for
philosophy in an introduction to disputed questions on the mystery of the
Trinity, Bonaventure defines philosophy's role very clearly; it follows from
his ideas about certainty. Philosophy undertakes no less than to disclose the
23. Romano Guardini, Systembildende Elemente in der Theologίe Bonaventuras. Die
Lehre vom Lumen mentis, von der Gradatio entium und der Influeήtia sensus et motus,
Studia et Documenta Franciscana 3, ed. W. Dettloff (Leiden: 1964).
24. De Mysteήo Tήnitatis prol., V 45ab: "Volentes circa mysterium Trinitatis
aliquid indagare, divina rjraevia gratia, duo praemittimus tanquam praeambula:
quorum primum est fundamentum omnis cognitionis certitudinalis; secundum est
fundamentum omnis cognitionis fidelis. Primum est, utrum Deum esse sit verum
indubitabile. Secundum est, utrum Deum esse trinum sit verum credibile."
25. See Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus Sancti 4,5 (see n. 73) this is the point
of reference for the Bonaventurian doctrine of the "vestigia Tήnitatis' which admit
of discovery by philosophical scientia; see also 4,11, V 475b: Όstendit igitur Salo-
mon se pervenisse ad triformem descriptionem scientiae philosophicae, scilicet ad
descriptionem scientiae rationalis, moralis et naturalis et ad triformen descrip-
tionem quarύmlibet istarum. Qui haberet descriptionem istarum scientiarum se-
cundum veritatem, maximum speculum haberet ad cognoscendum, quia nihil in
aliqua istarum scientiarum, quod non importet vestigium Trinitatis. Illud esset
facile ostendere, sed longum esset."
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foundation of all knowledge. Since theology requires a firm foundation in
order to be certain, it follows that theology needs philosophical analysis.26
Bonaventure's grounds for this view seem to lie in his analysis of the
human intellect. To the extent that reason must be understood as a kind of
image ("in quantum tenet rationem imaginis"), the knowledge of truth is
inherent in the rational soul {"mens rationalis")P You may already see the
relevance here of Bonaventure's theory of illumination—we will return to
it shortly. What is the foundation for each certain act of knowing to which
the natural appetite leads the rational soul? Bonaventure begins with an
analogy based on an analysis of a simple semantic structure. That which is
most certain "secundum se" is that which is first and most immediately true.
In "that which is first and most immediately true," therefore, not only is the
cause of the predicate included in the subject, but it is the fullness of being
itself which is predicated and which is the subject about which the predica-
tion is made. Now, a union of beings that are extremely distant from each
other is entirely repugnant to our mind, for no intellect is able to think that
one and the same thing exists and does not exist at the same time and in
the same respect. Therefore also the division of something that is entirely
one and undivided is inconceivable. "Hence to say that a being which
possesses the highest degree of existence is non-existent involves a most
evident fallacy, just as is the case in saying that to exist and not exist are one
and the same."28 For this reason, Bonaventure concludes, it is a perfectly
26. De Mysterio Trίnitatis qu. 1 a. 1, V 45a: "Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum Deum
esse sit verum indubitabile? Et quod sic, ostenditur triplici via. Prima est ista: omne
verum omnibus mentibus impressum verum indubitabile. Secunda est ista: omne
verum, quod omnis creatura proclamat, est verum indubitabile. Tertia est ista:
omne verum in se ipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile." See
in detail, Andreas Speer, Triplex Veήtas. Wahrheitsverstάndnis und philosophische Denk-
form Bonaventuras, Franziskanische Forschungen 32, (Werl/Westf: 1987), pp. 84-86.
Because it deals with its objects on the basis of natural or acquired knowledge,
philosophy is also able to offer a "mirror" to a theology founded on the evidence
of faith, which reflects the divine mysteries; see Breviloquium, prol. § 3, V 205a:
"Philosophia quidem agit de rebus, ut sunt in natura seu in anima secundum
notitiam naturaliter insitam vel etiam acquisitam; sed theologia tanquam scientia
super fidem fundata et per Spiritum sanctum revelata agit et de eis, quae spectant
ad gratiam et gloriam et etiam ad Sapientiam aeternam. Unde ipsa substernens sibi
philosophicam cognitionem et assumens de naturis rerum, quantum sibi opus est
ad fabricandum speculum, per quod fiat reprasentatio divinorum; quia scalam
erigit, quae in sui infimo tangit terram, sed in suo cacumine tangit caelum." See
Speer, Metaphysica reducens, pp. 155-59.
27. De Mysterio Tήnitatis, qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 49a: Έst enim certum ipsi comprehen-
denti, quia cognitio huius veri innata est menti rationali, in quantum tenet ra-
tionem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et
memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quern naturaliter tendit, ut in illo
possit beatificari."
28. DeMysteήo Tήnitatis qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 49b: Έst etiam illud verum certissimum
secundum se, pro eo quod est verum primum et immediatissimum, in quo non
tantum causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, sed id ipsum est omnino esse, quod
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evident judgment that the first and highest being must exist {"sicpήmum et
summum ens esse est evidentissimum in sua veήtate") . 2 9 But this first and highest
being is God.
This argument becomes easier to follow if one correctly understands
the meaning of the word "God" for Bonaventure in this context. Put briefly,
he is speaking of Anselm's God, that being "greater than which none can
be conceived." Bonaventure concludes that it is absolutely certain that this
God exists. This God is the first understood, the "pήmum cognitum" of the
human intellect. As such, He is present to every soul and every intellect as
the a pήoή condition of all knowing.30 This insight into the necessity of
God's existence is not one that our intellects in some way "develop." Rather,
it is the product of a "plena resolutio" or a complete analysis, that is, it arises
from the reduction of relative predicates to absolute predicates.31 In the
process, the intellect becomes aware of its own foundation. We do not deny
that Bonaventure builds his argument along the via Anselmi. Nor do we
overlook the transcendental element of Bonaventure's approach. Being in
general is conceived by means of non-contradiction, that is, by the same
means by which the intellect comprehends its first concepts, that is, being
and one. Bonaventure's use of the indiυisio-model to account for the ratio
of the "unum" you will note, bespeaks the strong influence of Philip the
Chancellor's masterpiece, his SUMMA DE BONO.32
Bonaventure's a pήoή foundation of human knowledge should not,
however, be taken as a blanket guarantee of certainty with respect to every
kind of knowledge. We can see this in Bonaventure's first great disputation
praedicatur, et subiectum, quod subiicitur. Unde sicut unio summe distantium est
omnino repugnans nostro intellectui, quia nullus intellectus potest cogitare, aliquid
unum simul esse et non esse; sic divisio omnino unius et indivisi est omnino
repugnans eidem, ad per hoc sicut idem esse et non esse, simul summe esse et nullo
modo esse est evidentissimum in sua falsitate."
For the translation see Zachary Hayes, trans, and ed., Disputed Questions on the
Mystery of the Tήnity (St. Bonaventure, 1979), pp. 116.
29. De Mysteήo Tήnitatis qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 49b.
30. De Mysteήo Tήnitatis qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 50a: "Sed ab eo intellectu, qui plene
apprehendit significatum huius nominis Deus, cogitando Deum esse, quo maius
cogitari potest, non solum non dubitari, an Deus sit, sed etiam nullo modo potest
cogitari Deum non esse."
31. See the "secunda via," which follows "ex decem conditionibus et supposi-
tionibus per se notis," the so-called disjunctive transcendentals: De Mysteήo Tήnitatis
qu. 1 a. 1 arg. 11-20, V 4b-47b. See further the second demonstration in the corpus
articuli "per privationem defecti", the third criterion is an incorrect analysis: "quan-
tum ad defectum in actu resolvendi incidit dubitatio, quando intellectus carnalis
nescit resolvere [. . .] usque ad substantiam incorpoream nee usque ad rerum
prima principia" {De Mysteήo Tήnitatis qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 49b).
32. See in particular Philipp the Chancellor, Summa de bono, vol. II, Corpus
philosophorum medii aevi II; ed. N. Wicki, (Bern: 1985), pp. 3-36 see on this point,
Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aqui-
nas, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 52, (Kόln: 1996), pp.
25-40, esp. 30-37
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on the knowledge of Christ, his (Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, which
he undertook shortly after incepting as an ordinary master. Bonaventure
discusses this question in his pivotal fourth quaestio: "Is what is known by us
with certainty known in the eternal Ideas themselves?"33 Bonaventure dis-
tinguishes as the two conditions for every certain knowledge an infallibility
on the part of the subject, and an immutability on the part of the object.34
The operative question here is: how can one know with certainty what
something is? Bonaventure's answer is by knowing it completely, that is,
under the conditions that cover both the object known and the subject
knowing.35 But how can this requirement be met?
At the beginning of the fourth question, Bonaventure discusses two
positions, both of which he considers inadequate and erroneous. It is not
the case that certain knowledge can exist only in the intelligible world of
the eternal prototype,36 nor can one speak merely of the "influence" of the
ratio aeterna on human knowing. It serves as a kind of eternal standard,
without it being the case, however, that ratio aeterna itself can ever be
attained.37 But created truth (veritas creata) is not merely unchangeable, it
is unchangeable as a consequence of a foundational condition. Bonaven-
ture thus seeks a third way between the two rejected positions:
In order to achieve with necessity a knowledge that lays claim to cer-
tainty, one seeks an eternal standard for guidance and direction, not
[for use] by itself and in its perfect clarity, but together with a created
standard, and in such a way that it is to some degree glimpsed by us
even in our state of imperfection.38
33. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi qu. 4, V 17: "Utrum quidquid a nobis
certitudinaliter cognoscitur, cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis."
34. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi qu. 4 c, V 23b: "cognitio certitudi-
nalis esse non potest, nisi sit ex parte scibilis immutabilitas et infallibilitas ex parte
scientis."
35. Chήstus unus omnium magister 6, V 568b-569a: "Ad cognitionem enim
scientialem necessario requiritur veritas immutabilis ex parte scientis. Omne enim,
quod scitur, necessarium est in se et certum est ipsi scienti. Tune enim scimus, 'cum
causam arbitramur cognoscere, propter quam res est, et scimus, quoniam impossi-
bile est aliter se habere'." Cf. Aristoteles, An. post. I, 271b 10-11.
36. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 22b-23a: "Uno modo, ut
intelligatur, quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem concurrit lucis aeternae evidentia
tanquam ratio cognoscendi tota et sola."
37. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi qu. 4 c, V 23a: "Alio modo, ut
intelligatur, quod ad cognitionem certitudinalem necessario concurrit ratio aeterna
quantum ad suam influentiam, ita quod cognoscens in cognoscendo non ipsam
rationem aeternam attingit, sed influentiam eius solum."
38. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi qu. 4 c, V 23b: Έt ideo est tertius
modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilicet quod ad
certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio
motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata,
et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae."
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This eternal standard is the ars aeterna, the eternal creative art, in which
things are considered according to their conceptual and specific mode of
existence, that is insofar as each constitutes a trace, an image, or a similitude
{secundum vestigium, imaginem et similitudinem) . 3 9
From this point of view, Bonaventure must reject the extreme positions
cited in the beginning; they lead to skeptical aporia, to the conclusion that
"one can know absolutely nothing" {quod nihil omnino contingeret scire).40
Beyond the a pήoή moment, an a posteήoή or empirical moment is indispen-
sable for the attainment of knowledge. In order to know, that is, the intellect
must not only turn itself toward the rationes aeternae, but it must also proceed
using essences abstracted from experience.41 In this context, the ideas are
not the obiectum quod of human knowledge—not that what we can per-
ceive—but only the obiectum quo—that through whose influence we attain
certainty. The ideas, insofar as they can be grasped at all by the human
intellect, can only be grasped reflexively by it. As formal principles of
knowing, they first guarantee certainty on the part of both the objects and
subjects of knowledge. But the specifying properties and material principles
arise out of experience.42
One sees the influence of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge which
Bonaventure discusses in considerable detail in the opposita of the fourth
question on the knowledge of Christ. In so doing, he arrives at a distinctive
solution that thoroughly modifies the received Augustinian conception.43
39. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 24a: "Creatura enim
comparatur ad Deum in ratione vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis. In quantum
vestigium, comparatur ad Deum ut ad principium; in quantum imago, comparatur
ad Deum ut ad obiectum; sed in quantum similitudo, comparatur ad Deum ut ad
donum infusum. Et ideo omnis creatura est vestigium, quae est a Deo; omnis est
imago, quae cognoscit Deum; omnis et sola est similitudo, in qua habitat
Deus.." Questiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4c, V 24a: "In opere vero, quod est
a creatura per modum imaginis, cooperatur Deus per modum rationis moventis; et
tale est opus certitudinalis cognitionis, quod quidem non est a ratione inferiori sine
superiori."
40. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23a.
41. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 224b. "Rursus, quia non
ex se tota est anima imago, ideo cum his attingit rerum similitudines abstractas a
phantasmate tanquam proprias et distinctas cognoscendi rationes, sine quibus non
sufficit sibi ad cognoscendum lumen rationis aeternae, quamdiu est in statu viae."
42. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b-24a; see further the
quaestiones "de ideis" in 1 Sent d 35 a 1, I 600-616, in particular 1 Sent d 35 a 1 q 3
c, I 608a: "Idea significat divinam essentiam in comparatione sive in respectu ad
creaturam. Idea enim est similitudo rei cognitae, quae quamvis in Deo sit absolu-
tum, tamen secundum modum intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cog-
noscens et cognitum."
See also Speer, Tήplex veήtas, pp. 97-102.
43. Compare the detailed discussion of the "rationes Augustini," esp. 1-8, V
I7a-18a, and the "obiecta Aristotelis," esp. 7-16, V 21b-22a, in the beginning of the
fourth question on the knowledge of Christ and the corresponding replies, ad 7-16,
V 25a-b.
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IV. ILLUMINATIO
As we follow Bonaventure's path of thought, it comes as no surprise that light
figures prominently in its epistemological and metaphysical contexts. Recall
that Bonaventure mentioned "being illumined by the spiritual radiation" as
one of the conditions for a true understanding of an exemplaristic metaphy-
sics.44 His motif of light invokes the Neoplatonic tradition. His reading of
Augustine leads him, moreover, to speak of light as the cause of a kind of
similarity. Following Pseudo-Dionysius and certain biblical texts, Bonaven-
ture also speaks of light as a means of unification. Both ways of speaking
hearken back to the Evangelist John's equation of light, truth and life.45
Bonaventure clearly speaks of light in many different contexts and in
as any different ways.46 Let me give some examples. In his De reductione
artium ad theologiam, Bonaventure describes a four-fold illumination ema-
nating from a fountain-like source (fontalis lux). This introduces a com-
prehensive division of the sciences, which rests on distinction between
illumination from "outside," from "underneath," from "inside" and
"above".47 The structure of the Collationes in Hexaemeron is itself built on a
six-fold ordering of vision (visio), beginning with the natural light (lumen
naturale) derived from the "facta est lux' of Genesis, and culminating in
the seventh vision of the glorification of the soul.48 Philosophy is associated
with the lumen naturale. In the fourth Collation—the one bearing on the
44. Cf. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1, 17, V 332b; cf. n. 18.
45. See in general, Josef Koch, "Uber die Lichtsymbolik im Bereich der Phi-
losophie und der Mystik des Mittelalter," Studium Generate 13 (1960): 653-70, rptd.
in Kleine Schήften I, ed. K. Bormann (Roma: 1973), pp. 27-67, esp. pp. 27-31; Klaus
Hedwig, Sphaera lucis. Studien zur Intelligibilitάt des Seienden im Kontext der mittelalter-
lichen, Lichtspekulation, BGPhThMA, N.F. 18 (Mύnster, 1980) pp. 23-45.
46. The following examples are focused on the epistemological aspect of light.
For the question of the physical light and how both aspects are interconnected, see
Hedwig, Sphaera lucis, pp. 161-72; and Emery, Jr., "Reading the World Rightly and
Squarely," pp. 201-6.
47. De reductione artium ad theologiam 1, V 319a: "Όmne datum optimum et
omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum', Iacobus in
Epistolae suae primo capitulo. In hoc verbo tangitur origo omnis illuminationis, et
simul cum hoc insinuatur multiplicis luminis ab ilia fontali luce liberalis emanatio.
Licet autem omnis illuminatio cognitionis interna sit, possumus tamen rationa-
biliter distinguere, ut dicamus, quod est lumen exterius, scilicet lumen artis
mechanicae; lumen inferius, scilicet lumen cogitionis sensitivae; lumen interius,
scilicet lumen cognitionis philosophicae; lumen superius, scilicet lumen gratiae et
sacrae Scripturae."
48. Collationes in Hexaemeron 3,24-31, V 347a-348b; see in particular 3,24, V
347a: "Praeter has est visio sextuplex, quae respondet operibus sex dierum; quibus
minor mundus fit perfectus, sicut maior mundus sex diebus. Est visio intelligentiae
per naturam inditae, et visio intelligentiae per fidem sublevatae, per Scripturam
eruditae, per contemplationem suspensae, per prophetiam illustratae, per raptum
in Deum absorptae. Ad has sequitur visio septima animae glorificatae, quas omnes
habuit Paulus."
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first vision of the natural light—Bonaventure gives a divisio philosophiae. It
is based on the three primary rays of the light of the first and highest
truth {tres radii primae veήtatis)—a truth which can neither be denied nor
conceptualized as non-existing.49 This passage recalls the question dis-
cussed above concerning that which is understood first by the human
intellect. Within his model of the three-fold truth—the truth of the beings
{veήtas rerum), moral truth (υeήtas morum), and the truth of language
(veήtas vocum)—Bonaventure integrates two rival models for the division
of the sciences, the Aristotelian/Boethian divisio and the Platonic/Stoic
divisio. Philosophy is, Bonaventure reminds us, the true love of wisdom. It
is also the science of all sciences (ars artium). As such, it encompasses both
the Aristotelian/Boethian division of philosophy into theology, mathema-
tics, and physics, and the Platonic/Stoic division into physics, logic, and
ethics. The science of sciences also encompasses the seven arts.50 To trace
out and expound Bonaventure's hierarchy of the sciences and its episte-
mological foundations would be a study unto itself.51
We return to Bonaventure's disputed questions on the knowledge of
Christ byway of this claim: the doctrine of illumination allows Bonaventure
to develop an epistemology rooted in exemplarism and the theory of ideas.
Generally speaking, light figures as a "metaphysical conjecture" about the
truth of things as well as a "model" for the relation between unity and
plurality, between the absolute and the conditioned, between ancestor and
descendant.5 2 In order to illustrate this, Bonaventure takes over from
Augustine the example of the godless person who can think a concept like
eternity and judge rightly regarding rules of practical living. What makes
49. Collationes in Hexaemeron 4,1-2 V 349ab: "Lux animae veritas est; haec lux
nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari
non esse nee exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat: quia, si veritas non est, verum
est veritatem non esse: ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, verum est
veritatem esse: ergo si veritas non est, veritas est. 'Super omnia enim praevalet
veritas', ut dicitur in Esdra. Emittit autem haec lux tres radios primos; unde in
Ecclesiastico: 'Tripliciter sol exurens montes'. Est enim veritas rerum, veritas signo-
rum seu vocum et veritas morum. Veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, veritas
sermonum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi.
Et istae sunt tres partes philosophiae."
Cf. Collationes in Hexaemeron 5,22, V 357b. Concerning the foundation and the
explication of Bonaventure's conception of truth, see Speer, Tήplex veήtas, esp.
chap. 3, pp. 37-52.
50. See the table at the end of the article. Concerning the divisio philosophiae,
see J. A. Weisheipl, "Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought," Medieval
Studies 27 (1965): 54-90, esp. pp. 62-64; see also Andreas Speer, Die entdeckte Natur.
Untersuchungen zu Begriiundungsversuchen einer <(scientia naturalis" im 12. Jahrhundert,
Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 45, (New York: 1995), pp.
124-25, and n. 181.
51. My doctoral dissertation (see n. 26) attempted something like this, focus-
ing on Bonaventure's notion of the three-fold truth {tήplex veήtas).
52. See Hans Blumenberg, "Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit," Studium Gene-
rale 10 (1957): 432-47; Hedwig, Sphaera lucis, pp. 161-65.
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the godless person capable of such things? The fact that in doing so "he
turns himself to that light by which he is always touched, even when he
turned himself away from it."53 The problem of certainty here emerges once
again, since Bonaventure sees, with Augustine, the cause of the pagan's
knowledge as lying within rules "that are written down in the book of that
light which is called Truth."54 These rules are obviously in force quite
independently of mistakes on the part of the knower.55 The metaphor of
illumination thus stresses the non-empirical origin of certain judgments.
Not all human knowledge has its origin in experience or can be taken as
the outcome of a process of abstraction. Although Bonaventure stipulates,
for the possession of perfect knowledge, the need to trace things back "to
an altogether unchangeable and fixed truth as well as to an altogether
infallible light" (recursus ad veήtatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem
omnino infallibilem) ,56 the influence of the light can nevertheless not be seen
as having general application. This divine light is not a cause of, say, wealth,
in the same way that, for Bonaventure, this light is a cause of knowledge. At
the same time, the light of illumination should not be seen as exclusively
exceptional or special, as if all knowledge was infused and no knowledge
was acquired or innate.57 The epistemological problematic in the theory of
illumination thus becomes especially pronounced when focused on the
individual subject. How are we to conceive concretely of the cooperation of
the infallible light of truth? I cannot answer this question satisfactorily at
present; however, I can suggest how Bonaventure opens manifold possibili-
ties for a nuanced reply by distinguishing carefully between a created
standard {ratio creata) and an eternal standard {ratio aeterna), between the
light of the creature (lux creaturae) and the infallible light (lux infallibilis),
53. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 236b: Έ t hoc est quod
Augustinus insinuat decimo quarto de Trinitate, capitulo decimo quinto: 'Com-
memoratur impius, ut convertatur ad Dominum tanquam ad earn lucem, qua etiam,
cum ab illo averteretur, quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est, quod et impii
cogitant aeternitatem et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum
moribus'." Cf Augustin, De TήnitateXTV, 15,21 (CCSL 50A, 451, 35-39).
54. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b: Ubi et subdit, quod
hoc faciunt per regulas, quae 'scriptae sunt in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur'."
Cf. Augustine, De TήnitateXTV, 15,21 (CCSL 50A, 451,49-50).
55. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b: "Quod autem mens
nostra in certitudinali cognitione alίquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommuta-
biles ratίones, requirit necessario nobilitas cognitionis et dignitas cognoscentis."
56. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b.
57. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23ab: "Praeterea, ilia lucis
influentia aut est generalis, quantum Deus influit in omnibus creaturis, aut est
specialis, sicut Deus influit per gratiam. Si est generalis: ergo Deus non magis debet
dici dator sapientiae quam fecundator terrae, nee magis ab eo diceretur esse
scientia quam pecunia; si specialis, cuiusmodi est in gratia: ergo secundum hoc
omnis cognitio est infusa, et nulla est acquisita vel innata; quae omnia sunt absurda.
Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam"
(see also n. 37).
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between a lower reason {ratio inferior) and a higher reason {ratio superior),
and between created wisdom {sapientia creata) and uncreated wisdom {sapi-
entia increata). To clarify the relationship and the tension within this two-
fold structure constitutes one of the main challenges for students of
Bonaventure's thought. It is a feature of his thought that figures with
particular importance in his later works—one which shows perhaps the
strongest influence of the Victorine tradition.58
V. REDUCTIO
Within Bonaventure's concept of metaphysics, reductiois, in a certain respect,
the complement of illuminatio. One way to be moved intellectually is to be
moved by what Bonaventure calls "spiritual radiation"; its complement is to
be "reduced to the highest."59 These terms suggest why we might not under-
stand reductio in a purely technical or formalistic sense. Here again, one
recognizes Bonaventure's epistemological approach, his analysis of the con-
cepts, and of understanding in the manner of a naturalis resolutio in order to
disclose the metaphysical constitution of beings.60 In the first book of his
commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure distinguishes the intellectus appre-
hendens, or "receiving intellect," from the intellectus resolvens, the analyzing
intellect. The intellect does not proceed by simply accumulating data, adding
one item of information to another. Instead, it regards the essence of beings,
which is to say, it understands effects together with their underlying causes.
Thus, the intellect no longer perceives the single thing, rather, it understands
how beings are interconnected and related to their common goal.61 The first
58. See Andreas Speer, "The Certainty and Scope of Knowledge: Bonaven-
ture's 'Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ,'" Medieval Philosophy and
Theology 3 (1993):35-61, esp. pp. 50-55.
59. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1, 17 V 332b; cf. n. 18.
60. Regarding the tradition of the "naturalis resolutio" see Ludger Oeing-Han-
hoff, "Analyse/Synthese," in Historisches Wόrterbuch derPhilosophiel, pp. 232-48.
61. 1 Sent d 28 dub 1, I 504a: "Sed quod possit intelligi aliquid praeter
alterum, hoc potest esse multipliciter: aut quantum ad intellectum apprehenden-
tem, aut quantum ad intellectum resolventem. Si primo modo, sic non potest
intelligi sine aliquo, quod est ei ratio intelligendi, sicut Deus praeter deitatem,
et homo praeter humanitatem; potest tamen intelligi effectus, non intellecta
causa, et inferius, non intellecto superiori, quia potest quis apprehendere homi-
nem, non intellecto aliquo superiorem. Et sic dicit Philosophus, quod, quo unum
dicit, quodam modo multa dicit, non simpliciter, sed quodam modo, quia im-
plicite. Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligere praeter alterum, intellectu resol-
vente; et iste intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia, sicut potest intelligi
subiectum sine propria passione. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut intellectu re-
solvente semiplene, potest intelligi aliquid esse, non intellecto primo ente. Intel-
lectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non
intellecto."
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step of such a reflexive analysis of knowledge is an analysis of concepts which
explicates what is implicit and undiscovered in what is known. In the third
chapter of his Itineraήum mentis inDeum (Mind's journey to God) Bonaven-
ture speaks of the operation of the intellect as that of perceiving concepts,
sentences, and conclusions. The intellect understands the signification of
the concepts which comprehend the definition of each being. It is charac-
teristic of definitions that the definiens is placed over the definiendum and is
given in more general terms; every definition of a special substance (specialis
substantia) requires common concepts and, in the end, the first principle of
all being, the ens per se, in order to be perfectly understood.62 Therefore
reductio does not lead to the "common" but to the "first" one. It is only in a
secondary sense that being-as-such can be understood as a common concept,
that is, insofar as being encompasses all that is. Here the doctrine of the
transcendentals fits into the analysis of the intellectus plene resolvens, but in a
very exemplary manner (and in a way very different, for example, from
Thomas Aquinas), referring to the doctrine of Alexander of Hales.63 If the
analysis of the intellect actually proceeds to its very end, then perceiving the
transcendentals as the first common concepts, the "conditiones entis," cannot
conclude the analysis. Such analysis would only be "semiplene," more or less
perfect. For being can be understood as incomplete or as complete, as
imperfect or as perfect, as contingent or as perse, and so on. Here Bonaven-
ture foreshadows the doctrine of the so-called "disjunctive transcendentals"
which Duns Scotus would later develop.64 Moreover, as Bonaventure ob-
serves quoting Averroes, privations and defects can only be comprehended
by reference to affirmative "modes" (positiones). Perfect and complete under-
standing includes the knowledge of a "eternal being as such" in its very end,
62. Itineraήum mentis inDeum 3,3, V 304a: Όperatio autem virtutis intellectivae
est in perceptione intellectus terminorum, propositionum et illationum. Capit
autem intellectus terminorum significata, cum comprehendit, quid est
unumquodque per definitionem. Sed definitio habet fieri per superiora, et ilia per
superiora definiri habent, usquequo veniatur ad suprema et generalissima, quibus
ingoratis non possunt intelligi definitive inferiora. Nisi igitur cognoscatur, quid est
ens per se, non potest plene sciri definitio alicuius specialis substantiae."
63. See in particular Alexander Halensis, Summa theologica lib. I, tr. 3, c, 1-2
nn. 72-73, ed. Quaracchi I, pp. 112-16. See on this point Aertsen, Medieval Philoso-
phy and the Transcendentals, pp. 40-48 (to Alexander of Hales) and, with regard to
the general account of Thomas Aquinas, 71-77; see also Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas
Speer, "Die Philosophic Bonaventuras und die Transzendentalienlehre," Recherches
de Theologie et Philosophie medievales LXIV 1 (1997) pp. 40-74.
64. Itineraήum mentis in Deum 3,3, V 304a: "Nee ens per se cognosci potest, nisi
cognoscatur cum suis conditionibus, quae sunt: unum verum bonum. Ens autem,
cum possit cogitari ut diminutum et ut completum, ut imperfectum et ut perfec-
tum, ut ens in potentia et ut ens in actu, ut ens secundum quid et ut ens simpliciter,
ut ens in parte et ut ens totaliter, ut ens transiens et ut ens manes, ut ens per aliud
et ut ens per se, ut ens permixtum non-enti et ut ens purum, ut ens dependens et
ut ens absolutum, ut ens posterius et ut ens prius, ut ens mutabile et ut ens
immutabile, ut ens simplex et ut ens compositum."
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i.e., being that "possesses the 'rationes' of all beings in its purity."65 Through
the ideas ("rationes') created and imperfect beings are related to divine
being. The idea, as an element of ratio aeterna, must be primarily understood
as assimilating things to God.66 With reference to a full and certain under-
standing of a single being, in the context of the disputed questions on
Christ's knowledge, reductio means to understand this single being not only as
such {in se), nor as it is in the soul {in animd), but also and especially insofar it
is in the eternal standard {in arte aeterna), also known as the eternal creative
art.67 Therefore, in light of the fact that things are considered according to
their conceptual and specific mode of existence, as a kind of trace, image or
similitude {secundum vestigium, imaginem et similitudinem) , 6 8 they belong also
to this kind of fundamental epistemological analysis, that is to this reductio.
Reductio leads back to the basic problem of the certainty of knowledge,
connecting this question with an exemplaristic concept of metaphysics
founded in the true understanding of the first and most perfect being as the
first understood and the highest principle both of the order of knowledge
and of the order of being.
VI. SCIENTIA VERITATIS UT SCRUTABILIS CERTA
I close with some summary reflections. First, in my estimation, one cannot
deny that there is a philosophy in Bonaventure. We have seen some of its
central ideas and their main sources. Recall Dante's presentation of
65. Itineraήum mentis in Deum 3,3, V 304a: "Cum 'privationes et defectus nul-
latenus possint cognosci nisi per positiones' [Averroes, In III de animal ten. 25], non
venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum,
nisi iuvetur ab intellectu entίs purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi et absoluti;
quod est ens simpliciter et aeternum, in quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate."
See Stephen F. Brown, ed., Bonaventure: The Journey of the Mind to God, trans.
Philoteus Boehner, (Cambridge. 1990), pp. 19-20, 61-62 nn.
66. 1 Sent d 36 a 3 q 2 c, I 629b: "Unde notandum, quod idea, sicut supra
dictum fuit in quaestione de ideis, dicit assimilationem extra genus. Prima autem
assimilatio est in ratione entitatis in Deo. Omne ergo quod de se dicit rationem
entitatis, sive sit compositum, sive imperfectum, sive materiale, sive passibile, sive in
actu, sive in potentia, potest Deo assimilari et produci; et ideo habet esse in Deo."
67. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b-24a: "Si ergo ad
plenam cognitionem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et
ad lucem omnino infallibilem; necesse est, quod in huiusmodi cognitione recurra-
tur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam dantem infallibili-
tatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilΐtatem scibili. Unde cum res habeant
esse in mente et in proprio genere et in arte aeterna, non sufficit ipsi animae ad
certitudinalem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, vel
secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utrobique sunt mutabiles, nisi
aliquo modo attingat eas, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna."
68. Quaestiones desputate de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, (V. 24a), see n. 39.
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Bonaventure's companions in the twelfth canto of the Paradiso.69 I want to
call attention to Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, and Joachim of Fiore, for these
individuals represent three main characteristics of Bonaventure's thought:
its search for the necessary foundation of human knowledge, its speculative
scope, and its emphasis on salvation history. I have spoken here predomi-
nantly of the Anselmian Bonaventure. We may take this as a partial answer
as to the place of philosophy in Bonaventure's thought.
My picture is, admittedly, one-sided; it downplays, for example, the
poetic character of Bonaventure's writing, what is often called the "mystic"
or "spiritual" part of his oeuvre. We should, however, as Dante warns us, be
wary of a sharp distinction between the spiritual and the intellectual. In the
eleventh canto of the Paradiso, following the custom of both orders to
celebrate the Feast Days of the founders of their orders, Dante has the
Dominican Aquinas praise Francis, and in the following canto, the Francis-
can Bonaventure praise Dominic. In this way, Dante not only passes an
interesting judgement with respect to the ecclesiastical rivalries of his time,
he also suggests that love and knowledge—"seraphic ardor" and "cherubic
light"—are one in God, so that "to praise one, whichever we take, is to speak
of both."70 In Bonaventure, indeed, the search for certainty and for the
limits of knowledge stand together, since the summit of human knowing is
only attained in spiritual contemplation.
But what does this mean for the question of philosophy and theology?
There is no doubt that Bonaventure thought of himself as a theologian,
and was, moreover, seen by his contemporaries as a theologus. But, keeping
in mind the whole history of philosophy, we should not neglect the fact
that the model of philosophy which celebrates the so-called "autonomy of
philosophical thought" is itself an historically-contingent model. Can one
credibly speak of "pure philosophical thought" in Aristotle, Averroes, or
Albert the Great? Do they possess authority as philosophers only insofar
as they fit into a particular cultural and scientific background—say that of
non-clerical masters in the Parisian Faculty of Arts? As much as we like to
believe that philosophy is "independent" today, when you come right down
to it, who is really interested in the glass bead games we play? Perhaps
modern enlightened philosophers are little more than the magistή ludi of
a very difficult game, the game that begins with the question: How can
we understand reality and the fact that we are? Might the vaunted "inde-
pendence" of philosophy today amount to little more than a confession
that the leaders of other disciplines—the physicists for example or the
economists—are the ones telling the stories that really "work" for contem-
porary society? Philosophers are left, in their "autonomy" and "inde-
69. Dante, La Commedia divina, Paradiso XII, 133-41.
70. Dante, La Commedia divina, Paradiso XI, 37-39: "L'un fu tutto serafico in
ardore /Γaltro per sapienza in terra fue di cherubica luce uno splendore." Cf.
Etienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher (London: 1948), pp. 242-53.
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pendence," to play a complicated game that means little to anyone apart
from the players themselves.71
Bonaventure, as we have seen, relates philosophy to theology. Redu-
cing this relationship to the ancilla (or handmaid) model seems insufficient
to explain the place of philosophy within the whole sweep of Bonaventure's
thought. We have seen that Bonaventure recognized the indisputable need
for a philosophical analysis of theology. This analysis is—especially with
regard to metaphysics—conceptualized as a fundamental critique of the
scope and certainty of human knowledge.72 Every science based on reason
stands under the verdict of fallibilism. Although Bonventure underscores
the flnitude of human knowledge, he does not mean to deny the validity of
the use of reason in respect to certain objects. There is a wide field for the
positive autonomy of scientific rationality, as Bonaventure explains in the
fourth collation of his Hexaemeron, with his model of the three-fold truth in
the horizon of the natural light.
The Hexaemeron, as Joseph Ratzinger has suggested, represents a spe-
cific kind of theological synthesis from the perspective of a history of
salvation.73 But in over-emphasizing its antiphilosophical character, in
dwelling on its opposition between the "truth of salvation" to the "pure
truth of reason," Ratzinger misses Bonaventure's point that, given the
epistemological criteria Bonaventure articulates in this text, even theology
must be seen as but a provisional kind of knowing.
This model is still present, albeit in very concise form, in the Collationes
de septem donis Spiήtus sancίi, (the Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy
Spirit) where Bonaventure develops a four-tiered account of knowledge.74
Philosophical knowledge deals with a knowledge of the truth that can be
scrutinized as "certain knowing" (ut scrutabilis notitia certa) Pb Theological
71. The centennial exhibition "Books of the Century" at the New York Public
Library provides a striking corroboration of the diminished influence of philoso-
phy. Philosophy is represented on this list by a single title—Sartre's L'etre et les
neants—under the heading "Mind and Spirit." By contrast "Economics and Tech-
nology" constitutes a heading of its own. One may also find titles like J. R. R.
Tolkien's The Hobbit and A. A. Milne's wonderful book Winnie-the Pooh.
72. See Bonaventure critique with respect to the "philosphi," who cannot give
the promised tenth science: contemplation and wisdom. Collationes in Hexaemeron 4,
1, V 349a: Έt sic possent explicari omnes difficultates philosophiae. Philosophi
dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem.
Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magis erroribus
se immiscuerunt." Cf. also Collationes in Hexaemeron 5,22, V 357b. See Speer,
"Metaphysica reducens," pp. 177-80.
73. See Ratzinger, Die Geschichtsphilosophie des hi. Bonaventura, esp. pp. 148-49;
Speer, Triplex veήtas, pp. 224-30.
74. Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus sancti 4,5, V 474b: "Scientia philosophica
nihil aliud est quam veritatis ut scrutabilis notitia certa. Scientia theologica est
veritatis ut credibilis notitia pia. Scientia gratuita est veritatis ut diligibilis notitia
sancta. Scientia gloriosa est veritatis ut desiderabilis notitia sempiterna." See also
the table at the end of the article.
75. Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus sancti 4,6, V 474b and 77.
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knowledge contains a knowledge of truth that is worthy of belief by "pious
knowing" (ut credibilis notitia pia).76 In addition to these, Bonaventure
speaks of "gracious" and "glorious" knowledge. The former is based on a
knowledge of truth rooted in a "lovable holy knowing" (ut diligiblis notitia
sancta) .7 7 The latter is related to a way of knowing the truth which Bonaven-
ture calls "desirable eternal knowing" (ut desiderabilis notitia sempiterna) .7 8
Utilizing this four-fold distinction, Bonaventure carefully explains the scope
of each kind of knowledge and also of the related sciences. It is remarkable
that the role of philosophy is not contested here. Quite the contrary:
philosophy obtains again the position of a speculative theology, in the
tradition of the Boethian notion of theologia, while theology, by comparison,
becomes scriptural theology or exegesis. Bonaventure thus opens anew a
debate about the character of theology vis-a-vis philosophy. A point of
reference for this debate can be seen in Meister Eckhart's unfinished
project of the Opus tήpartitum, a work which integrates metaphysics, specu-
lative theology, and scriptural exegesis within a unifying hermeneutics and
follows the twelveth-century model of a deductive or axiomatical theology.79
76. Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus 4,13, V 476a and 77.
77. Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus 4,19, V 477b and 77.
78. Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus 4,25, V 479ab.
79. See Wouter Goris, "Trout iudicaverit expedire'. Zur Interpretation des
zweiten Prologs zum 'Opus expositionum' Meister Eckharts," Medioevo 20 (1995):
233-78.
